(A continuation from the previous post.)
In 1879, Wundt’s increasing interest in the strength and extent of nerve stimulation plus his transference from his studies in Zurich to the University of Leipzig’s Institute of Psychology would be marked by a post ceding immediate rapid increase of scientific experimentation in psychology. The credibility of Wundt’s experiments was bolstered as he accepted possibilities of statistical error, a concept borrowed from German psychophysicist Gustav Fechner. The primary basis for his original reaction-time investigation was his insistence that psychology imposed sustained reasoning because the study derived and explained complex physical processes through simpler means.
In the ensuing decade, American psychologist William James supported the first formal psychology experiment through his greatest contribution, the publication in which he announced psychology as the “science of mental life” with regards to the study’s form and underlying aspects.
Furthermore, James elucidated the complex process, which Wundt had compromised for experimental means, at the neuronal level. He additionally professed there were two ways to viewing sensation, both of which were required in Wundt’s lab. People could physically perceive an attribute, such as through sight or touch, or they could dedicate thoughts to an attribute without maintaining a real relationship to it. With respect to Wundt’s lab, these differing concepts ultimately and respectively referred to physically perceiving the stimulus versus awaiting it.
By the following decade, immediately after Wundt’s revolution, an unknowing opposition was already proliferating under the same notions of psychology. Austrian Sigmund Freud was crafting an authoritative new subcategory, psychoanalysis, which would come to defy and haze scientific psychology’s standards. Suddenly, defense mechanisms—from repression to regression—became common justifications for ambiguous actions whereas other concepts—such as parapraxis, the Oedipus complex, and hedonistic fixations—transformed the public’s view of human nature into a simplistic struggle solely based on desire.
In his own way, Freud was the Wilhelm Wundt of psychoanalysis. Yet by classifying his study as a metapsychology—an offspring of the parent study—his unintended reform hindered psychology’s further establishment as a discipline. In one such example, Freud advocated that one’s characteristic guilt could be derived from a committed bad action or simply the proposed thought of committing such a deed. Although this subject correlated with emotions, the concept was indirectly supported by Wundt’s claims, which held conjectures with regards to thinking about perceiving a signal versus actually discerning it.
A few decades later, Swiss analytic psychologist Carl Jung, a follower and expander off of Freud’s claims, also alienated scientific psychology when he asserted that humans would never fully understand themselves. He noted that the individual consciousness was an exception to statistical rules, and a result, valuable empirical data would never be obtainable.
Above all, psychoanalysis’ largest role in psychology was the simplicity that it advocated in observing human nature. According to the Freudian psychoanalyst, humans’ memories, thoughts, and ideas were all structured from ponderings on sexuality. Although this statement was mainly Freud’s opinion, the idea proved so compelling at the time that it stuck and developed. As a result, such philosophical input afflicted the pure science as the latter evolved and regained some of its pre-revolution shaky theoretical aspects.
APPLICATIONS OF THE SCIENCE
As the 20th century further unraveled, scientific psychology proved somewhat resilient to the allegations that denied its viability. Although the discipline’s trunk still had some philosophical remains, newer branches provided unique studies that complied with the field’s empirical standards while promoting novel methods for the science’s application.
Forty years after the revolution, classical conditioning materialized into one of psychology’s most significant offshoots. Russian polymath Ivan Pavlov came center-stage with his experiments on animals in which he used their simple-minded associations to represent the macrocosmic complexity in humans. Yet contrary to Wundt’s experiment, Pavlov analyzed the speed of reflexes that could not be controlled. His experimentation greatly consisted of projecting an external stimulus at the same time that the animal produced its instinctive “reflex reaction” toward an ordinary stimulus. After several repetitions, the animal would unknowingly learn to automatically produce the instinctive reaction in response to the previously random stimulus as well. This experimentation with animals demonstrated how the simplicity of human innateness could be applied to work in the utmost methodical manner.
Just years after classical conditioning’s incipience, American behaviorist B.F. Skinner emerged, among others, as the primary advocate of behaviorism. Although he viewed behaviorism to be a philosophy-subsidiary of behavioral science, the characteristics that he attributed to his study resembled many of those that were prominent in scientific psychology. Forms of empirical data were deemed valuable while natural selection and evolution fueled the study. Skinner enforced his study’s pedestal on the operant plane, in which various reinforcements—consequences for a specific behavior—could be manipulated to drive a person to act accordingly. While some radical thinkers—such as Skinner—placed behaviorism as an investigational field of only unemotional drives, others included the former with associated feelings, which altogether diversified the presiding science. Psychology now included experimentation on conscious mental responses, which incidentally alluded to Descartes’ early theorizations on mind-body interactions.
Gestalt psychology provided another constructive branch-off—initiating circa 1910 and then developing in the following decades—through the combined efforts of founders German Kurt Koffka, German Wolfgang Kohler, and Czech Max Wertheimer. The study required for discerned movement to produce a sum of basic sensations in the human mind. In the decades to come, the Gestalt model represented this foundation at the broader altitude of individuality. The primary goals for psychologists in Hitler’s regime reflected gestaltism’s notions while the study strengthened in Germany and then spread internationally and for America.
Psychology’s revolution from a theorized humanity into an investigational science ultimately proved a success. Wundt’s essential Leipzig laboratory formally postulated human behavior and thought in a manner that had never before been pursued during the predecessors of biology, physiology, and philosophy. The elite innovators of Germany merged the three sciences into one discipline that consequently altered the international perception of the field. Then the open-minded America transformed into the forefront for the radical infant science, and novel subfields sprouted. While some swayed the science precariously, the overall result was a diverse school of thought with a marked finesse based on scientific investigation. Most importantly, whilst psychology delved into the mind’s processes at the microcosmic level, it also illuminated a macrocosmic humanity that otherwise would never have been explored without the key contribution of this crucial “science of mental life.”
 Wilhelm Max Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, trans. Edward B. Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1904), 75, accessed November 19, 2011, Google eBooks.
 Mandler, 55-60.
 James, 1.
 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 1:88, accessed January 29, 2012, Google eBooks.
 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 2:3.
 Dorian Feigenbaum, “Freud’s Latest Contribution,” The Nation, May 11, 1927, 537, accessed January 29, 2012, MAS Ultra – School Edition (13659575).
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 84.
 Carl G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self with Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 25-7.
 Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. A. A. Brill (New York: Random House, 1966), 62-6.
 Ivan P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes, trans. Gleb V. Anrep (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2003), 5-7.
 B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), 46.
 Mandler, 10.
 Stanley M. Herman, “Toward a More Authentic Manager,” Training & Development Journal 25, no. 10 (October 1971): 10, accessed January 29, 2012, Professional Development Collection (8812404).
[A continuation to Psychology’s Development into a Science.]
A small room, furnished with homely carpets and paintings, is brightly lit and air-conditioned. An elongated leather sofa in the corner of the room faces an open window overlooking the city. An exhausted man lies on the sofa, legs crossed and arms folded, as he stares vaguely through the window. He ponders aloud about his day, indifferent to any listeners. Over time, his words scratch through the veneer of his thoughts and into his more clandestine contemplations. Behind him, a professionally dressed woman jots down notes while interjecting every so often.
The scenario is classic. It is the archetypal Freudian setting to the minutest detail. Anyone who walked in on this appointment would know it. Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud’s ideas have become so widespread that, even a century after their establishment, they are still recycled and debated over.
Many would argue that Freud deserved such fame. He introduced free association therapy, as aforementioned, in which a client jumps freely from thought to thought while the therapist takes notes. Freud’s thoughts on personality—largely, the superego, ego, and id—have influenced how people view the actions of others and themselves. Literary classics have been shaped by Freud’s tenets, including William Golding’s allegory Lord of the Flies, in which the author’s three main characters—Ralph, Piggy, and Jack—coincide with the representations of the ego, superego, and id, respectively.
Some of Freud’s justifications for behavior, despite their controversy, have survived the century. Although people may not be familiar with the names of the theorist’s scientific terms, they often know the intended meanings behind them. For example, Freud’s system of defensemechanisms—including repression, displacement, projection, rationalization, reaction formation, and regression—illustrates an individual’s attempt to transfer anxiety using methods of distorting reality. Projection and reaction formation are ways of viewing situations in the opposite light in order to better their appearance. Displacement and regression summarize the means in which the individual reverts to more-so immature actions in order to vent feelings.
The most well-known of the mechanisms are rationalization—in which an individual justifies his actions to feel better about them—and repression—where one dissolves all anxious thoughts and memories from consciousness. Concurring with repression, Freud’s coinage of parapraxis, the “Freudian slip,” refers to when an individual accidentally voices a repressed idea in writing or speech.
The thinker’s opinions on sexual desires were revolutionary for their time, although most are now disclaimed. He introduced the psychosexual stages of fixations throughout human development along with the Oedipus- and Electra-complex relationships between children and their parents.
Freud altogether delved into basic mental processes and related all human motives to unconscious or hidden desires. His thinking was radical, even though it was basically derived from his opinions and everyday observations. But most importantly, society connected such theoretical thinking to psychology, the “science of mental life,” according to William James. [See the previous article.]
In this sense, psychoanalysis hindered psychology’s development into a science. It would be more reasonable for psychoanalysis to instead be a subcategory of philosophy, which entails the opinions and theories on life that psychoanalysis encompasses. Because of psychoanalysis’s association with psychology, society has enslaved the latter to a humanity study that involves therapy and theorization.
On the contrary, psychology is a broader subject that can incorporate biology, chemistry, physics, or therapy, depending on the direction of focus that one chooses. Psychologists do not have to be therapists; they can specialize in neuropsychology, psychobiology, psychophysics, mathematical psychology, and more.
Many of the notions in psychoanalysis have been deemed faulty, while some people consider the entire subject flawed. The study’s views cannot be derived through scientific experimentation because they developed from mere observation and opinionated interpretations. Thus, it only makes sense that psychoanalysis be classified with the theorizations of philosophy rather than the investigations in psychology.
Freud’s psychoanalysis has caused a segment of psychology to become stale; it cannot be developed further unless it is greatly modified.
Even if Freud may not be competition for timeless philosophers Aristotle, Plato, and Locke, he most certainly does not belong with psychologists Wundt, Skinner, and Pavlov.